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A. There is issue with Material Facts; Forbearance was a precedence set by Micron
regarding SMT for many years and was for the benefit of Micron in their efforts to
sell into Latin America. SMT was allowed to remain in business by Micron for the
primary purpose of an outlet and sales of Micron products.
B. No consideration was given for the personal guarantee.
C. Agreement was ambiguous: agreement doesn't take into consideration that there is

an existing obligation of SMT prior to Goldman's acquisition of SMT to Micron for
over $2.4 million which is guaranteed by Goldman as a result of inducing Micron
from time to time to extend credit to SMT. Providing credit terms from time to time
is not specific in light of the amount of debt that is "guaranteed" by this agreement.
IV. Conclusion
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
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A. INTRODUCTION.

'

'

l

'
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This appeal arises from the final judgment on a motion for summary
judgment in favor of Micron Semiconductor products Inc. (hereinafter,
"Micron") against the Appellant, Gregory I Goldman (hereinafter,
"Goldman"). In the final judgment granting summary judgment, Micron was
awarded the collection of a $ l million limited personal guarantee provided
by Goldman for a debtor company that Goldman owned.

Goldman alleges that there was no consideration for the guarantee, but the
court ruled that forbearance was the consideration for the guarantee.

Goldman alleges that the limited guarantee was provided in return for
specific consideration which was not provided and that forbearance was not

I
I
I
I

provided for the benefit of Goldman but for Micron. Goldman alleges that
Micron intentionally misled Goldman to gain his limited personal guarantee.
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
Micron filed its complaint on February 23, 2012. Micron filed a motion for
summary judgment on June 20, 2013. The District Court heard Micron's
motion for summary judgment on September 16, 2013 and granted Micron's
motion for summary judgment on September 20, 2013. Goldman filed its
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notice of appeal on October 30, 2013. Goldman filed an Amended Notice of
Appeal on November 14, 20 I 3.

C. STATEMENT OF FACTS.
This matter arose due to a complaint and demand for payment on Goldman
for a limited personal guarantee provided on obligations of SMT of
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America, a company owned by Goldman, whose primary supply was

'<

product from Micron. Micron represented 80% of the supply purchases of
SMT of America.

Goldman purchased SMT of America, a customer of Micron, in 2005 and
owned the company until its liquidation in 2012. SMT was losing money at
the time of Goldman's acquisition and the company was insolvent and
APPELLANTS BRIEF -
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unable to pay its debts and obligations to Micron. Micron had consistently
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forbeared the obligations of SMT of America because of the significant sales
potential that SMT provided Micron in all of Latin America. SMT had
purchased over $100 million of material over a four-year period prior to
2007. This represented significant earnings and profit to Micron and one of
the main reasons they ignored the insolvency of SMT of America.

Goldman took over SMT of America in the hopes of turning the business
around and generating profits. In the seven years that Goldman owned SMT
of America, most of the working capital/excess cash flow went to pay off
old debt to Micron assumed at the acquisition and at the same time
purchased over $50,000,000 of new product that Micron made money from
while getting cash in advance for material.

I
I
Goldman purchased SMT of America in December 2005 for $300,000 cash.
Micron was owed by SMT of America over $2.4 million and sales of the
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company were in excess of $30,000,000.
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Within months of the acquisition, however, Micron demanded payments of
its outstanding receivables by SMT and a personal guarantee by Goldman or
Micron would stop shipments of supply to SMT. Goldman and Micron
negotiated the payment terms and supply terms, along with Goldman
agreeing to provide a limited guarantee of $1 million, in an effort to move
forward and keep SMT from shutting its doors.

SMT was only provided material on a cash in advance basis going forward
which payments went toward oldest obligations. SMT would make
additional payments to the old debt based on amount of new product shipped
by Micron. In addition SMT was to be provided significant levels of
consignment inventory. These primary terms had been provided to SMT

.
I
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multiple times prior to the acquisition of SMT by Goldman under previous
ownership and during Goldman's ownership of the company. Goldman did
not receive the level of material or consignment contemplated by this
agreement prior to or after the signing of the limited guarantee.
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Goldman had purchased the company for $300,000 and had no reason to
provide a limited personal guarantee of$ l million if not for the agreement
that Micron would provide material and consignment inventory going
forward. It would have been in Goldman's best interest to take the loss of
$300,000 rather than sign on for a $1 million obligation. On the other hand,
Micron was selling to SMT of America over $10 million per year of
profitable material and there financial interest was supported by continuing
to supply SMT of America even if they couldn't pay back their obligation, at
the time of $2.4 million. To this point, Micron's credit manager admits that
maybe Goldman can keep SMT in business long enough to support any
losses that occur by not collecting on the debt. Micron clearly made more
money in the subsequent sales of materials over seven years than the loss
incurred from non-collection of SMT' s liquidation. See Affidavit of Gregory

Ib
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'

Goldman Paragraph 21.
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II. ISSUES

Question of Material Facts: The personal guarantee was not in exchange for
Micron's forbearance on collection of debt, rather it was in exchange for the way
and timing in which the debt was to be paid back and the material required to be
provided to SMT to succeed as a business. Both condition were necessary for the
personal guarantee. Micron believes that the Material facts are that they forbeared
on collecting on the debt that SMT owed Micron and gave SMT more time to pay
their debts and continue to sell product to SMT. This fact is in dispute, and
summary judgment should have been denied because Micron had been giving SMT
extended time to pay their debts prior to the acquisition of SMT by Goldman and
during the brief ownership of SMT by Goldman. This practice of extending time
for SMT to pay was a precedence set by Micron over 8 years of doing business
with SMT.

Further, Micron believes that continuing to sell products to SMT was a benefit to
SMT but because SMT was required to buy material for cash in advance, the
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benefit was only to Micron as they had no risk of collection and continued to sell

•'

product in the market.

'

'

Micron believed that the obligation of $2.4 million is a material fact and
undisputed. I believe that this is not a material fact. This $2.4 million is less than
5% of the amount of material that SMT purchased since the acquisition of SMT by
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Goldman and less than 1.6% over a IO year period of purchases by SMT. What is
more significant dispute of fact is that Micron was to provide and maintain
consignment inventory of more $500,000 with SMT at all times. Micron only
provided up to $100,000 on consignment which limited SMT' s ability to sell
product on a monthly basis. SMT was turning over consignment inventory almost
2x per month. Because of the lack of material on consignment, SMT was
generating sales for only 20% of their customer demands. This impact was more
than $8.0 million of sales per year ($400,000 more of consignment on hand turned
over about 2x per month) that SMT could have achieved that would have made
SMT more profitable and sustainable.
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The District Court didn't recognize that there were other material facts that a jury
would have considered in order to determine whether the guarantee lacked
consideration.

I

Unambiguous Guarantee: Micron believes the guarantee is unambiguous, but

I
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Goldman believes that the guarantee is ambiguous. The guarantee calls for Micron
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to provide credit to SMT from time to time. Micron provided no credit from time
to time upon the signing of the personal guarantee. This fact alone should void the
guarantee.

Consideration: As stated above, Micron believes that they provided consideration
for the guarantee in that they forbeared on the collection of debt and provided new
material to SMT. Goldman believes that forbearance was not new and material was
for cash in advance. In addition, Micron didn't forbear anything. Micron didn't
lower their debt and they didn't change their terms (except to require cash in
advance, which was stricter). They only decided to wait longer to collect all
outstanding payments and interest; a practice that they had employed with SMT
many times. They did not demand interest on the payments and, I believe, used this
APPELLANTS BRIEF - 11
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instance to extract a personal guarantee from Goldman only. This is not
consideration. Although Micron agreed to continue supplying material for cash in
advance there was no risk ofloss or non-collection because of the prepayment.

SMT' s position with Micron was that Micron provided most of the supply required
by SMT to stay in business and without Micron supply, they would have gone out
of business earlier. Because of this, Micron chose to continue providing material

I
I

to SMT (on a cash basis- and no risk) to offset any losses that would incur from

I
I

Selling for cash in advance allowed them to eliminate the risk of collections and

I

non-collectability of debts from prior to the acquisition of SMT by Goldman.

prosper on new shipments.

•

The question of who got consideration from the "forbearance" is a question of fact

I
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for the jury to decide and not a judge on Summary Judgment.

A Jury should decide whether there was consideration and not a Judge on

I

I

Summary Judgment.

'

'

l

'

APPELLANTS BRIEF - 12

I

I
Unconscionability: In addition, the personal guarantee is unconscionable because
Micron was the biggest beneficiary of the guarantee. Micron controlled the destiny
of SMT of America as their largest single supplier of memory chips, could decide
to withhold from shipping product or supply at any time, was an expert in the
marketplace on pricing and fluctuation, had superior knowledge of the industry and
had complete leverage in bargaining power with Goldman. Goldman's limited
knowledge, pointed out by Micron in their internal correspondence, clearly
disadvantaged him in his negotiations. Micron used their knowledge of the
marketplace, took advantage of Goldman's inexperience in the memory business,
pressured Goldman by withholding shipments to get a commitment of guarantee
that Micron used to support their already uncollectible receivable from SMT of
America. The volatility of the marketplace, evidenced by the global bankruptcy of
major memory suppliers around the world and eventually SMT's demise, was well
known to Micron and not Goldman, who was not from the industry. Micron's $8.0
Billion in revenue's vs SMT's small revenue's of less than $20 million (in 2011) is
an example of the global company taking advantage of the small guy.

On this basis alone, the guarantee should be voided.
APPELLANTS BRIEF - 13

ll

i

I
I

III.
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ARGUMENT
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Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Micron claims in its Motion for
Summary Judgment, Section II. Statement of Facts (2) that "Micron agreed to sell
additional product to SMT on revised credit and payment terms, agreed to waive
any claim on interest owing on SMT' s outstanding debt obligation to Micron, and
agreed to sell up to $100,000 worth of product to SMT on consignment payment
terms." These facts are not correct.
Micron did not sell additional product to SMT on credit, and there were no
payment terms. Micron was selling product to SMT prior to the signing of the
Personal Guarantee and thereafter on a cash basis only. Micron provided in
discovery, Eufemia email dated February 14, 2006 which claims that "Micron is
abused by the current arrangement of 1 for 1." See Ex. 51 to Goldman Aff This "1
for I" refers to SMT paying $1 of cash at time of the order for $1 of material sold
and delivered by Micron. Further, Inskeep states in his email of February 17, 2006
to Eufemia that "All we can do is keep selling them (SMT) the same amount they

I
I
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pay us (1 for I) and hope we can make enough money on the sales to offset the
$2M we may eventually write-off." See Ex. 52 to Goldman Aff.
Upon arriving at an agreement on March 23, 2006, Inskeep emailed
Micron's Gary Black suggesting that Gary Black move "SMT to the watch section
of this report since they no longer have a credit line and are pre-paying for new
shipments." See Ex. 53 to Goldman Aff. Finally, in Micron's Credit File Analysis
report of 10/30/2006 which was after the delivery of the limited personal
guarantee, Micron states "SMT and Micron have reached the following agreement:
1. SMT will purchase from Micron material on a regular basis (as they have
previously done for many years) on a Cash basis." See Ex. 54 to Goldman Aff.
This is direct evidence in opposition to Micron's Gary Black's Affidavit
suggesting that SMT received "new credit and payment terms."
In addition, see Affidavit of Jose Gonzalez in Support of Denying Micron's
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Gonzalez Aff.") who also states no credit was
provided SMT upon reaching an agreement to repay Micron. See Ex. 55 to

I
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Goldman Aff. This discrepancy in material fact alone should warrant denying of a
Summary Judgment. But further evidence exists to clearing show there are
additional discrepancies as it relates to material facts.
APPELLANTS BRIEF - 15

Under Idaho law, and the general principles of contract formation,
consideration is required for the creation of a new contract or the modification of
an existing contract. Brand S. Corp. v. King, 639 P.2d 429, 431 (Idaho 1981)
(finding that there was no evidence of consideration given in exchange for a
promise to forego collection), citing Dashnea v. Panhandle Lumber Co., Ltd., 64
P.2d 390 (1937). "A promise to do, or the doing of, what one is already bound by
contract to do, is not valid consideration." Dashnea v. Panhandle Lumber Co., Ltd.,
64 P.2d at 393 (quoting lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. Mittry, 226 P. 1076, 1078
(1924)). "[W]here a party merely does that which in law he is bound to do, he
cannot demand any additional payment therefore and if he obtains an additional
promise from the other party, it is nudem pactum and unenforceable." MasseyFerguson Credit Corp. v. Peterson, 102 Idaho 111, 119-120 (Idaho 1980) (finding
the terms of the agreement unenforceable for lack of consideration).
Micron claims in Section II Statement of Facts (2) that "In exchange for the

I

Guaranty ... " This exchange refers to the agreement negotiated between SMT and
Micron on March 28, 2006, on paying back old debt (accumulated by the previous
owners of SMT prior to Mr. Goldman's acquisition of SMT) memorialized in the
letter dated March 28, 2006. See Ex. 21 to Goldman Aff.
APPELLANTS BRIEF - 16
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The agreement states that the Hub will be at levels "consistent with previous
practice". See Ex. 21 to Goldman Aff. Goldman was lead to believe that the
consistent level of the Hub material provided by Micron was $500,000. In addition,

'

'
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\o,

Micron was selling SMT Hub material leading up to the negotiations which
culminated in Defendant agreeing to provide a limited personal guarantee m
exchange for volumes of material and higher Hub inventory. Discovered m

~'

•
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documents provided by Micron, Micron was selling as much as $657,000 to SMT
Hub material. See Ex. 4 to Goldman Aff. Micron was "squeezing" or reducing the
Hub material just prior to and during the negotiations that lead to Defendant
agreeing to provide a limited personal guarantee in exchange for volumes of
material and higher Hub inventory. Micron's claim that it agreed to sell up to
$100,000 worth of product to SMT on consignment payment terms reflects a
decline in "previous practice" and a continuation of an already established
exchange of product not a new consideration.
Micron's own Credit File Analysis directly refers to the terms agreed to in
the letter agreement dated March 28, 2006.) and the terms that were agreed to in
order for Defendant agreeing to provide a limited personal guarantee in exchange
for volumes of material and higher Hub inventory. See Ex. 54 to Goldman Aff.;
APPELLANTS BRIEF- 17
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see also Ex. 21 to Goldman Aff Neither Micron's continuing to sell to SMT on a
cash basis in order to get old debt repaid nor the continuation of the Hub at levels
less than previously established constitutes revised credit and payment terms or
new arrangement for Hub inventory especially since Micron was already providing
this. Goldman received nothing in return for his limited personal guarantee.
Defendant, Goldman, Pro Se, requests the Court to deny Micron's motion
for summary judgment because Goldman has established the existence of disputed
issues of material facts as evidenced by, among other things, Jose Gonzalez's and
Gregory I. Goldman's Affidavits directly contradicting the Affidavit of Micron's
Gary Black.

In addition, the personal guarantee is unconscionable because Micron was
the biggest beneficiary of the guarantee. Micron controlled the destiny of SMT of
America as their largest single supplier of memory chips, could decide to withhold
from shipping product or supply at any time, was an expert in the marketplace on
pricing and fluctuation, had superior knowledge of the industry and had complete
leverage in bargaining power with Goldman. Goldman's limited knowledge,
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pointed out by Micron in their internal correspondence, clearly disadvantaged him
in his negotiations.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reason that there is issue with material facts, no consideration was provided
for the personal guarantee, and that the contract is Unconscionable, the District
Court's Decision and Order on the Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of
Micron should be reversed.

DATED THIS 19th day of February 2014.

Isl Gregory I. Goldman, Pro Se

Gregory I. Goldman, Pro Se
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